

THE IMPLICATIONS OF ARMS RACE ON WELFARE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT DURING THE COLD WAR

Abdussalam Hassan Bello

Department of Political Science, Bayero University, Kano

Corresponding Author's email: abdussalambello@yahoo.com



DOI: 10.29816/sjss.7.2.15

ABSTRACT

The primary concern of this paper was to examine the impact of arms-race between super powers on welfare technology development during the cold war. After a brief introduction, the paper conceptualized key terms, traced the genesis of the cold war and the subsequent arms race. The paper examined the magnitude and implications of the budgetary allocations made in favour of the defence sector during the period. The study consequently discovered that the arms race between the superpowers during the cold war era surreptitiously robbed the world of significant progress in welfare technology development.

Introduction

Perhaps one of the essential features that justify the superiority of the human person in the animal kingdom is his ability to make meanings out of the bounties of nature. Man continues to simplify his existence by adapting the objects of nature to suit his predilection. Through advancement in technology, man can move faster on land, he can also move on water and in the air. He can communicate instantly with others in all parts of the globe. Man constructs skyscrapers with shock absorbers to lessen the effects of hurricane and earthquakes. He irrigates land to produce all types of fruits in dry seasons. He invents fridges to protect his food stuff against spoilage. He conditions air to suit his desired humidity. All these aspects of technology are the results of human endeavour to maximise his welfare and to make life easier and more

comfortable. Unfortunately, with the advent of cold war the world began to witness a reverse in welfare technology development. That is, moving away from a technology that was welfare friendly to a novel technology that made life difficult and miserable. The new technology was the one that concentrated on developing armaments rather than human welfare essentials. This paper aims at critical analysis of the implications of such developments in the international system.

Clarification of Concepts

Arms Race

The term arms race refers to intense competition among technologically advanced countries for the production and supply of sophisticated military equipments including weapons of mass destruction.

Social Welfare

The term, according to Midgley (1997), “is a state or condition of human well-being that exists when social problems are managed, when human needs are met, and when social opportunities are maximized.’ The absence of the aforementioned is what Richard Titmuss (1974) calls “social ill fare”.

Social Development

Social development is the governmental programme that seeks to enhance the well-being of the population as a whole through harnessing the power of economic development for social ends (op cit p.181).

Welfare Technology

A working definition of the above concept sees it as a special type of technology that governments pursue to enhance social development programmes. So, it is simply a welfare- oriented technology.

The Cold War

It was a name given to development in political, economic and military inter-relations between nations after the 2nd WW. The name emerged as a result of the division of the whole international system into two blocks namely the NATO and Warsaw pact. The NATO was headed by the U.S.A. and had a membership of the West European capitalist countries; while the Warsaw pact was headed by the former Soviet Union with the membership of the former East European socialist countries.

Theoretical Background

This study is conducted within the context of the “public choice theory (PCT)”. It is of course one of the few theories that expose the behaviour of individual role players in policy-making and policy implementation.

The theory is a brainchild of Economics that developed from the study of taxation and public spending. Its popularity followed the authorship of a book, the *Calculus of Consent*, by James Buchanan (a onetime winner of Nobel Prize in Economic Science) and his co-author Gordon Tullock.

The theory clarifies how administrative officials relate with their political bosses while participating in the process of decision making. Such relationships are described in the following scenarios:

Self interests: individuals try to satisfy their interests first before those of anyone else. That is why politicians manipulate politics to satisfy their selfish interests via vote-buying, wealth transfer, etc. (Machan, 2008).

Rationality: That an individual is naturally rational in his choices. In other words, he consciously or unconsciously arranges alternative courses of action in a form of scale of preference. The implication of rationality is that, it may sometimes be extremely difficult to offer sound advice to the leader or policy maker *en route* to administrative blunder. The main reason is that the rationality of the leader may be telling him that he is on the right track.

Benefit-maximizing: the theory assumes further that individuals think in terms of issues, ways and means that could pave way for them to maximize benefits out of any deal. For example, Starr (1988) argues that the managers of bureaucratic firms seek to maximize budgets in order to obtain greater power, larger salaries and other fringe benefits.

Uncertainty-minimizing: individuals are, in most cases, reluctant to take risks of challenging or even lodging legitimate complaints when they feel that such actions

could be deemed confrontational by their superiors. But, such individuals are never reluctant to do so when they are certain that such challenges could create some golden opportunities for them to maximize benefits. Moreover, the theory assumes that the darkest aspect of decision-making process is **the rent seeking stage**. This is the stage where certain interest groups attempt to persuade governments to grant them some valuable monopolies or legal privileges instead of executing good policies that will be beneficial to the masses.

The theory was criticized on grounds that it has contributed less to the field than its popularity suggests (Green and Shapiro 1994). Again, Schram and Caterino (2006) aver that, the theory negates the natural science model which is the most appropriate methodology in Political science due to its emphasis on quantification and mathematics.

Nevertheless, despite the shortcomings identified above, the arguments forwarded by the PCT remain the theoretical guide in this analysis. The expectation is that, the theory will ultimately expose the reasons why political authorities venture into costly military spending as against welfare development.

Literature Review

The rationale behind the unending saga of arms proliferation in a world that is poised to establish sustainable development, peace and security is certainly one of the major paradoxes that brought to the fore the topicality of 'the Guns versus Butter debate'. In fact, whenever the issue is tabled for discussion the advocates of military spending are usually quick to point out that it is the most effective way to protect a country and its teeming populace. It was argued, for instance, that 'lower military spending usually leads to weaker defences and higher risks for a country's security' (Archer and Willi, 2012). The ensuing review, not only debunks the

position of supporters of militarization, it also gives some valuable insights on the reasons for the incessancy of war and exposes its primary beneficiaries.

First, in one of the findings of the study conducted in 2011 by the Institute for Economics & Peace, it is proved that the overall microeconomic effect of major military conflicts involving the U.S. tends to be counterproductive. The study indicates clearly that in all cases, the taxpayers were forcibly made to pay the price of such conflicts (IEP, 2011).

Similarly, citing the stimulating anti-militarization speech delivered by President Eisenhower in 1953, Henderson (2010) argues that 'War makes us poor'. He argues further that, far from rescuing the economy from recession or depression, military expenditure simply drains capital from productive uses. For him therefore, it is always better to spend public funds on other productive sectors of the economy rather than on military expenditure (Henderson, 2010). Surely, the preceding position is not new because as far back as 1795, James Madison observed that, 'of all the enemies to public liberty war is, perhaps, the most to be dreaded because it comprises and develops the germ of every other' (cited in Shah, 1998).

Another work that strongly castigates the positions of the securocrats is the one conducted in 2005 by Professor Mary Kaldor. The author argues, in the monograph, that if colossal stock of military hardware was not a sufficient guarantee of winning a war with even a relatively weak country as it happened between Russia & Afghanistan, America & Vietnam; the squander of public wealth on military expenditure is therefore antithetical to rationality (Kaldor, 2005).

Sharing similar position with Kaldor, Stiglitz (2003) maintains, that any attempt to prosecute a war is a point-blank irrationality. One of the reasons is that, the consequences

of war are always uncertain and could be detrimental to the socio-economic life of the society. For example the boom experienced in the U.S. in 1990^s was swept away by the ensuing recession of 1991 following the involvement of America in Gulf crises. The aforementioned therefore is clearly a pointer that peace is always more preferable than war (Stiglitz 2003).

Likewise, in another analysis, 'the Social and Economic Effects of Nuclear War' by Katz, A. & Osdoby, S. R. in 1982, the anti-profligacy crusade against high military spending was intensively justified. First, the authors assessed the horrifying repercussions the U.S. may incur in case of nuclear attack. The degree of casualties in case of even a first strike action is far beyond imagination. For example, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) produced estimates of 7 to 15 million deaths alongside 10 to 20 million injuries, most resulting from radiation exposure due to fallout. The ensuing repercussions of such scenario include, among other things, draining the public treasury to finance huge demands for medical services to treat injuries and cases of Psychological trauma, evacuation and relocation exercises, adjustments in all sectors of the economy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1979).

Paradoxically, despite the negative comments by the leading economists and research organizations against military spending, the phenomenon never subsides. Thus, it may not be out of place to investigate the causative agents and major beneficiaries of military confrontations or high outlays. One of the striking responses to the raised conundrum rests blame squarely on the American foreign policy. This is because in its bid to contain communism and Islamic fundamentalism at all costs, the U.S. foreign policy facilitated room for exorbitant expenditure on military activities especially

during the hay days of cold war (Francis-Wright, 2003).

Similarly, Higgs (2005) observes that, ideological blindness in the minds of American foreign policy architects is the main causative agent to the U.S. involvement in arm conflicts. This is because; the policy makers are excessively dedicated to serving the interests of Israel's Likud Party and some political power brokers who are haunted by the spectre of some possible aggressions either by communists or Islamic fundamentalists.

Again, in the same work, Higgs (2005) sticks to his gun that costly military spending is senseless and deceptive. He condemned the position of securocrats who assume that, war promotes security. For him, the gospel truth is that the masses are merely hoodwinked into believing that war is meant to benefit them. Nevertheless, the stark reality, according to him, is that such spending merely serves the interests of politicians and their cronies. Similarly, Lofgren (2013) *ala* Higgs (2005) is also of the opinion that, the major beneficiaries of costly military spending are the political leaders and their supporters among the power-elite.

Undoubtedly, one thing that is evidently clear from our literature review is that, justice has not been done to the protagonists of war and high military outlays. The degree of causalities that could be sustained in case of first strike action as stated above indubitably makes some meaning to their position. Secondly, the review is unbalanced because information asymmetry exists. The actual truth is that the information superhighway is more replete with documents and reports made available for public inspection by the NATO allies rather than their Warsaw counterparts.

The Genesis of Cold War and the Subsequent Escalation of Arms Race

In the immediate aftermaths of the 2nd World War the world witnessed an outright overhaul of global politics. The former major powers notably Germany, Japan, Britain, and France lost their prestige of playing the leading roles in global affairs. That development paved way for the emergence of two new superpowers, the United States and the USSR (Ashton, 1989). Again, the emergence of those two new superpowers turned a new page in Global politics. It was a page of intense ideological rivalry and competition. Such ideological strife manifested itself in the division of the world into military alliances and political power blocs. This division led to the division of the world into two grand military alliances: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), created by the Western powers in 1949; and the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact, established in 1955(Ashton, 1989).

The members of the NATO at that time included the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Japan, and Canada. While those in the Warsaw were mainly countries of the Eastern Europe comprising Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Romania and a little later, Cuba and China.

The competition between the two blocs escalated when the Soviets under the headship of Joseph Stalin began the process of exporting the Communist ideology to Europe and other parts of the globe. That development was perceived as a threat to the corporate existence of the capitalist NATO members. The United States under the leadership of President Harry S. Truman reacted by first issuing the renowned Truman Doctrine. The policy authorized U.S. aid amounting to \$400,000,000 to anti-Communist forces in Greece and Turkey. Moreover, the policy of *containment doctrine*, which was an expansion of the earlier policy,

was later adopted to justify support for any nation that the U.S. government deemed threatened by the Soviet ideological expansionism. Containment soon became the official U.S. policy with regard to the USSR.

Another development that fanned the embers of arms race occurred when, in June 1950, Stalin endorsed the plan of North Korean Communist leader Kim IL Sung to attack South Korea, assuming that the United States and other major powers would not get involved.

This mistaken assumption led to the Korean War (1950-1953) that became the first armed conflict of the cold war. The Korean War led to a major increase in defence spending by the United States. Because American leaders saw Stalin's actions in Korea as a potential precursor to aggressive movements in Europe, the war helped prompt the United States to turn NATO into an ambitious and permanent military structure.

Moreover, the most serious Cold War confrontation between the United States and the USSR that raised the spectre of nuclear war occurred in 1962. In the summer of that year, the U.S. government discovered that the Soviets were in the process of deploying nuclear missiles in Communist Cuba. That scenario created serious tension and standoff in the whole world. The resulting clash, during which the entire world stood seemingly on the brink of ultimate disaster, ended with Khrushchev capitulating to the demands of the U.S. president John F. Kennedy (Brinkley & Griffiths, 1999).

In a nutshell, the cold war arms race reached its zenith in the 80^s when Ronald Reagan won the presidency of the United States. As part of his defence ambition, President Reagan embarked upon the development of the most advanced weapon systems and war strategies ever deployed by the US military. Such developments included among others: the Star Wars project and the

re-introduction of Neutron bomb stockpiling. On its part, the Soviet Union responded by conducting similar initiatives and, at the same time, modernizing its worn-out arsenals thus further stressing its already stagnating and inefficient state-run economy.

The Strategic Defence Initiative (Sdi): Star Wars

The Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), also known as Star Wars, was a program first initiated on March 23, 1983 under President Ronald Reagan. The intent of that program was to develop a sophisticated anti-ballistic missile system that had the capacity to prevent missile attacks from other countries, specifically the Soviet Union.

“The weapons required for effective execution of star wars include: space- and ground-based nuclear X-ray lasers, subatomic particle beams, and computer-guided projectiles fired by electromagnetic rail guns—all under the central control of a supercomputer system.” (MSN Encarta, 2007 Microsoft). By using that system, the United States would have the ability to intercept all intercontinental ballistic missiles while they still flew high above the Earth. Although the initiators of the programme were hopeful that their effort would have become a praiseworthy revolution in science and technology; yet the reverse turned-out to be the case. In fact, due to excessive political pressure, both domestic and international, coupled with consideration of heavy financial commitments involved, the Strategic Defence Initiative was eventually abandoned. The natural implication of the star war initiative was that it consumed over thirty billion dollars yet no laser and mirror system was ever used, not on land, not in space (BBC News. 13 Dec. 2001).

The Neutron Bomb

The neutron bomb was the leading strategic military initiative in the late 50^s and early 60^s.

The neutron bomb is a special type of weapon that kills humans but spares things like tanks, buildings and property intact. The neutron bomb idea was tested successfully between 1958 and 1961, though the politicians in Washington strongly kicked against its development and deployment. Unfortunately, Ronald Reagan reversed the idea when he won the presidency of the United States. He ordered for the construction of a thousand neutron bombs. But criticism from European allies kept the weapons from being deployed across Europe. Interestingly, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism as we knew it, the Bush administration moved to dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons, including the Reagan's stockpile of neutron bombs. Unfortunately, it was later discovered that many other nations had not been afflicted by the U.S. blindness regarding neutron bombs elimination. The countries that were found to have heavy stockpiles of neutron bomb included: China, Russia and the state of Israel (Coleman, 1992).

The intense rivalry and competition between the two rival blocs, which the intelligentsia named Cold-war, continued up to 1991 when the Soviet Union crumbled and consequently chickened out of the competition (Webel & Galtung, 2007).

The Nature and Socio-Economic Consequences of Military Spending During the Cold War

At the height of the cold-war the world witnessed an unprecedented spending on armaments of all manners of sophistication. For example, besides nuclear arsenals, inter-continental ballistic missiles, multiple warheads, and thermo-nuclear bombs, the Warsaw Pact alone had on its side, a military organization of eight million active-duty troops and first-line reserves. It had at its disposal more than 9000 tactical aircrafts, 65,000 tanks, thousands of advanced missiles

of all ranges, and more than 50,000 nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (the US 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review). In fact, it is on records that Moscow stagnated her economy by committing up to 25 percent of the Soviet gross national product (GNP) in the military industry at the expense of consumer goods and investment in civilian sectors during the late Brezhnev years (Towle, 2005). While on the NATO side, the U.S. alone had, during 1948-86, committed a total of \$6,316 billion, averaging about \$162 billion per year, or 7.6 percent of GNP (Towle, 2005). It is also on record, that at the height of the cold war the defence sector engaged in an

intense competition with the civilian sector for the attraction of scarce human resources. For instance according to the 1980 report of the United Nations special session on disarmament, at least 25% of all scientists and engineers who were engaged in Research and Development (R and D) were occupied with military R and D efforts. It is worth noting that R and D made up a large proportion of the military budgets of the developed states and almost half of the amount expended on this part of the total military expenditures went into the payment of salaries of that group of scientists. However, the table below illustrates further:

The Summary of Outlays for The Conduct of Research and Development in The U.S. (1949-1991)

Fiscal Year	In Millions of Dollars			In Billions of Constant (FY2005) Dollars			As Percentage of Total Outlays			As Percentage of GDP		
	National defence	Non-defence	Total	National defence	Non-defence	Total	National defence	Non-defence	Total	National defence	Non-defence	Total
1949	762	178	940	5.2	1.2	6.4	2.0	0.5	2.4	0.3	0.1	0.3
1950	772	282	1,054	5.3	1.9	7.3	1.8	0.7	2.5	0.3	0.1	0.4
1951	846	279	1,125	5.5	1.8	7.3	1.9	0.6	2.5	0.3	0.1	0.4
1952	1,204	291	1,495	7.6	1.8	9.4	1.8	0.4	2.2	0.3	0.1	0.4
1953	1,553	295	1,848	9.6	1.8	11.4	2.0	0.4	2.4	0.4	0.1	0.5
1954	1,551	297	1,848	9.5	1.8	11.3	2.2	0.4	2.6	0.4	0.1	0.5
1955	1,550	345	1,895	9.4	2.1	11.5	2.3	0.5	2.8	0.4	0.1	0.5
1956	1,898	428	2,326	11.2	2.5	13.7	2.7	0.6	3.3	0.4	0.1	0.5
1957	2,134	577	2,711	12.1	3.3	15.4	2.8	0.8	3.5	0.5	0.1	0.6
1958	2,459	729	3,188	13.6	4.0	17.6	3.0	0.9	3.9	0.5	0.2	0.7
1959	5,364	1,020	6,384	29.2	5.5	34.7	5.8	1.1	6.9	1.1	0.2	1.3
1960	5,937	1,385	7,322	31.9	7.4	39.3	6.4	1.5	7.9	1.1	0.3	1.4
1961	6,922	1,864	8,786	36.6	9.9	46.5	7.1	1.9	9.0	1.3	0.4	1.7
1962	7,090	2,747	9,837	37.1	14.4	51.5	6.6	2.6	9.2	1.2	0.5	1.7
1963	7,144	4,221	11,365	36.9	21.8	58.8	6.4	3.8	10.2	1.2	0.7	1.9
1964	7,865	5,931	13,796	40.2	30.3	70.5	6.6	5.0	11.6	1.2	0.9	2.2
1965	7,077	6,763	13,840	35.5	34.0	69.5	6.0	5.7	11.7	1.0	1.0	2.0
1966	7,097	7,821	14,918	34.9	38.5	73.3	5.3	5.8	11.1	0.9	1.0	2.0
1967	8,068	7,894	15,962	38.4	37.6	76.0	5.1	5.0	10.1	1.0	1.0	2.0
1968	8,544	7,628	16,172	39.3	35.1	74.4	4.8	4.3	9.1	1.0	0.9	1.9
1969	8,314	7,346	15,660	36.6	32.3	68.9	4.5	4.0	8.5	0.9	0.8	1.7
1970	8,021	7,132	15,153	33.5	29.8	63.3	4.1	3.6	7.7	0.8	0.7	1.5
1971	8,108	7,301	15,409	32.2	29.0	61.3	3.9	3.5	7.3	0.8	0.7	1.4
1972	8,837	7,466	16,303	33.5	28.3	61.9	3.8	3.2	7.1	0.8	0.6	1.4
1973	9,139	7,896	17,035	33.2	28.7	62.0	3.7	3.2	6.9	0.7	0.6	1.3
1974	9,406	8,028	17,434	31.9	27.3	59.2	3.5	3.0	6.5	0.7	0.6	1.2
1975	9,715	8,821	18,536	29.8	27.1	56.9	2.9	2.7	5.6	0.6	0.6	1.2

1976	9,819	10,169	19,988	28.1	29.1	57.3	2.6	2.7	5.4	0.6	0.6	1.1
1977	10,874	10,569	21,443	29.0	28.2	57.2	2.7	2.6	5.2	0.6	0.5	1.1
1978	12,077	12,455	24,532	30.2	31.1	61.3	2.6	2.7	5.3	0.5	0.6	1.1
1979	12,129	14,196	26,325	28.0	32.8	60.9	2.4	2.8	5.2	0.5	0.6	1.1
1980	14,643	15,592	30,235	31.1	33.1	64.2	2.5	2.6	5.1	0.5	0.6	1.1
1981	16,937	17,231	34,168	32.8	33.3	66.1	2.5	2.5	5.0	0.6	0.6	1.1
1982	19,809	14,850	34,660	35.9	26.9	62.7	2.7	2.0	4.6	0.6	0.5	1.1
1983	22,298	13,602	35,900	38.7	23.6	62.2	2.8	1.7	4.4	0.6	0.4	1.0
1984	25,765	15,221	40,986	43.1	25.4	68.5	3.0	1.8	4.8	0.7	0.4	1.1
1985	30,360	16,856	47,216	49.2	27.3	76.5	3.2	1.8	5.0	0.7	0.4	1.1
1986	35,656	16,485	52,141	56.4	26.1	82.5	3.6	1.7	5.3	0.8	0.4	1.2
1987	37,097	16,459	53,256	57.2	24.9	82.1	3.7	1.6	5.3	0.8	0.3	1.1
1988	38,032	18,568	56,100	56.8	27.0	83.8	3.6	1.7	5.3	0.8	0.4	1.1
1989	40,366	20,354	60,760	58.0	29.3	87.4	3.5	1.8	5.3	0.7	0.4	1.1
1990	41,078	22,732	63,810	57.0	31.5	88.5	3.3	1.8	5.1	0.7	0.4	1.1
1991	37,887	24,296	62,183	50.6	32.5	83.1	2.9	1.8	4.7	0.6	0.4	1.0

Source: the United States Bureau of the Budget, the Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, 1991.

Furthermore, while explaining the ugly side of such scenario especially on its relationship with other vital sectors of human activities such as welfare technology development, the draft declaration of the special session of the General Assembly on Disarmament: (A/AC.187/55/Add. 1 of 24 January 1978) stated as follows:

Military expenditures have reached the staggering figure of about \$400 billion a year, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to nuclear-weapons states and their allies, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of increasing expenditure spreading to other countries. Vast human, natural, scientific, technological and financial resources are thus wasted in the preparation for war, when these resources could be channelled to eradicate hunger, disease and other pressing economic and social problems hampering development in many parts of the world.

Similarly, it was further observed that at the height of the cold war period “tax concessions and a massive increase in military spending produced a deficit in the American federal budget which put an effective limit on

government spending well into the next century (Karger, 1992).” Again, Goldstein (2006) discovered, in another investigation, that:

In the early 1950^s, the U.S. economy (GDP) was about twice the size of the next six advanced industrial states combined with almost half of the world’s financial reserves. Unfortunately, by the end of 1980^s, its relative share of world GDP had dropped almost by half amounting to only 10 percent.

The trend above was natural and unavoidably necessary taken into consideration the heavy expenditure on the cold war commitments. It was observed further, that in the aftermath of the cold war the U.S. economy began to rise up again, in the mid-to late-1990^s, as a result of technological change and restructuring. The U.S. began to experience low unemployment, low inflation, robust growth, stock market gains, and a budget surplus. Unfortunately, the economy started going back to square one as a result of economic disruptions born-out of heavy military spending in response to September 11 terrorist attacks (Goldstein, 2006).

The manifest function of the above implications, according to this study, is that heavy spending on armament and promoting war-related technology at the mercy of the welfare technology naturally leads to economic stagnation thus adversely affecting the general welfare of the commonalty. Part of the reason is that, modern weapons are extremely expensive and technically complex to reproduce. For example, a modern fighter in the 1980^s, noted Blanning (2000), costs forty times the small monoplanes of 1940. And for the cost of a heavy bomber, General Eisenhower remarked in 1953, that “a state could build thirty schools or two fully equipped hospitals” (Blanning, 2000: 232). Related to the above, Goldstein observed that:

Out of fear of potential Soviet attack against Japan, the United States maintained 60,000 troops in Japan with weapons, equipment and logistical support. And the Japanese government paid the U.S. several billions of dollars annually to offset about half the cost of maintaining those troops (Goldstein, 2006: 88).

Some Efforts towards Arms Limitation during the Cold War

Prone by the dangers of a possible nuclear holocaust, the world leaders and diplomats began a series of arms limitation discussions with the aim of persuading the two military giants (US & USSR) to bring an end to arms racing. One of the reasons for that move was that the world leaders could not see any meaning to such huge and very expensive undertakings. The worst irony of the whole scenario was that each of the two giants had amassed enough weaponry that was capable of destroying the whole world ten-twenty times over (Rhodes, 1986).

Interestingly, series of talks popularly known as strategic arms limitation talks (SALT 1) began in November 1969. The efforts

culminated into signing of a treaty in 1972. It was agreed, in the treaty, that the two powers should reduce the number of bombs, anti-ballistic and offensive missiles in their possession. Although the USSR was allowed to retain more weapons than the USA the reason was that the Americans had the more sophisticated weapons. And to ensure compliance with the provisions of the treaty, both countries were allowed to use spy satellites. Unfortunately, soon after the signing of the treaty, some fresh attempts to construct even more sophisticated and more expensive weapons began (Carter, 1989). However, despite frustrations that followed the non-observance of the provisions of SALT 1, the world leaders did not relent in their efforts to bring an end to the arms race adventure.

In late 1972, another series of talks called (SALT2) began. That round of talks lasted up to 1979 thus spilling over the regimes of Nixon, Ford and Carter. Although SALT 2 were more difficult to implement because some more sophisticated weapons were to be deliberated upon, yet it graduated into another treaty. Interestingly, under the new agreement the amount of weaponry to be available for each of the factions was precisely defined. Furthermore, despite the fact that President Carter was highly impressed with the agreement, the American senate refused to ratify the treaty. The congressmen complained that the USSR had persistently refused to honour exiting agreements on arms limitation as stated in the Helsinki accords. Hence, despite deliberate extension of their influence in Africa and Asia, the Russians also invaded Afghanistan (Carter, 1989).

Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper attempts to x-ray the implications of government high spending on military expenditure rather than concentrating on welfare technology development during the

cold-war. Taken into consideration the positions of scholars on the impact of militarism, especially on public welfare; the paper assumes that over spending on military expenditure is nothing more than promoting the interests of securocrats, politicians and their rent-seeking accomplices. To the common man, competition should be intensified on welfare technology development rather than military researches hence his life would be better-off.

It is therefore recommended, that the entire world community should join hands to contain the proliferation of arms at all costs. And to do that, the committee of nations should pressurize the principal actors in global affairs to expedite action towards ensuring harmonious coexistence between the state of Israel and her Arab neighbours. Again, they should resort to skilful diplomacy to cajole Iran, North Korea and other nuclear building aspiring states to eschew the idea.

Bibliography

- Archer, C. and Willi, A. (2012). *Opportunity costs: military spending and the UN's development agenda: the International Peace Bureau: Rue de Zürich, Geneva, Switzerland*
- Ashton S.R. (1989). *In search of detente-the politics of East and West relations since 1945*. The Macmillan press Basingstoke: Hampshire.
- Blanning, T.C.W. (2000). *The Oxford History of Modern Europe*. Oxford University Press: USA.
- Brinkley, D. & Griffiths, R.T. (1999). *John F. Kennedy and Europe*. Eisenhower Centre for American studies.
- Carter, A. (1989). *Success and failure in arms control negotiations*. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute: Oxford University Press.
- Coleman, J. (1992). *Conspirators' hierarchy: the story of the committee of 300: America* West Publishers
- Francis-Wright, T. (2003). Three Lessons for America, Volume III, Number.
- Goldstein J. S. & Pavesehouse J.C. (2006) *International relations* (7th ed). Quebcon World Taunton. New York: USA
- Green, D. and Shapiro, I. (1994). *Pathologies of rational choice theory*: Cambridge University Press.
- Henderson, D.R. (2010). *War makes us poor*. The Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California
- Higgs, R. (2005). Benefits and Costs of the U.S. Government's War Making, *The Independent Review Volume IX, Number 4*. The Independent Institute, 100 Swan Way, Oakland
- Higgs, R. (2006). *Depression, War, and Cold War: Challenging the Myths of Conflict and Prosperity*. The Oxford University Press. New York
- Kaldor, M. (2005). *We have to think about the security of individuals rather than the protection of borders*. London school of Economics: UK.
- Karger, H. (1992). Income maintenance programs and the Reagan domestic agenda. *Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare*, 19(1), 45-62.
- Katz, A. & Osdooby, S. R. (1982). *Social and economic effects of nuclear war. Analysis No. 9*: the Cato Institute.
- Lofgren, M. S. (2013). *Is war good for the economy?* TheHuffingtonPost.com, Inc.
- Machan, T. (2008). *Good governance: as if people matter*. Indian Social Institute, New Delhi.
- Midgley, J. (1997). *Social welfare in global context*. SAGE Publication Ltd. Bonhill Street: London.
- Rhodes, R. (1986). *The making of the atomic bomb*. Simon & Schuster, Rockefeller Centre, New York.
- Schram and Caterino (2006). *Making Political Science matter: debating knowledge, research and method*. New York and London University Press.
- Shah, A. (1998). *World military spending*. <<http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending>>.
- Starr, P. (1988). *The meaning of privatization*. Yale Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 6-41.
- Stiglitz, J. (2003). *The myth of the war economy*. Retrieved August 12, 2010, from The Guardian: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/jan/22/iraq.economy>
- Titmuss, R. (1974). *Social policy: An introduction*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Towel, P. (2005). Cold war. In Townshend, C. (ed.). *The Oxford history of modern war*. Oxford University Press.
- Vogt, M.A. (1980) *the United Nations special session on disarmament: a report*, the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs.
- Webel, C. & Galtung, J. (2007). *Handbook of peace and conflict studies*. Routledge, Madison Avenue, New York.
- America withdrawals from ABM Treaty. BBC News. 13 Dec. 2001.
- The Institute for Economics & Peace (2011). *The economic consequences of war on the U.S. economy*. Sydney - New York - Washington D.C.
- The Paradoxes of post-Cold War US Defence Policy: An Agenda for the 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review, Project on Defence Alternatives Briefing Memo #18. Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, February 2001.