

TRANSNATIONAL INSURGENCY AND ITS IMPLCATIONS ON NIGERIA'S STATE SOVEREIGNTY

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Abstract

Boko Haram insurgency has taken a transnational dimension with its members, activities and recruitment efforts cutting-across Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Mali. The transnational nature and activities of Boko Haram has implications for the Nigerian state since its response in the form of co-counterterrorism coordination with other states has the propensity to affect the sovereignty of Nigeria. Literature on Boko Haram is replete with the narratives of the origin, activities as well as the impact of the insurgent group on Nigeria's security and economy. The implication of the transnational nature of the insurgent group on Nigeria's sovereignty is one area that is yet to get much attention. The study therefore highlights the implications of the transnational nature of Boko Haram insurgency on the Nigerian state sovereignty. The study adopted the historical method employing the use of a wide range of secondary source of information. The study revealed that the implications of transnational activities of Boko Haram on Nigeria's sovereignty are multifaceted because the coordinated counterterrorism efforts of affected states have led to violation of mandates in multinational operations and influx of troops under the guise of co-combating insurgency in Nigeria's territories without the knowledge or approval of the Nigerian government. Furthermore, the transnational activities of Boko haram have loosened important cultural and psychological sovereignty of the Nigerian state because some Nigerians have acquired loyalties as well as sympathy for Boko Haram that supplement and override feelings on national solidarity. Hence, their sympathies have manifested in the insurgent group eroding state solvencies through the instruments of corruption and subtle co-option of state officials. The paper recommended that the Nigerian government and other affected states should intensify their internal counter insurgency strategy in order to bring an end to the menace as well as eradicate the Boko Haram insurgent group.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Nigeria, Sovereignty, Security, Insurgency, Transnational, Implication.

Introduction

Over the past decades, different forms of domestic and international insurgencies have been witnessed around the world. In the past, most insurgencies and terrorist activities occurred in the Middle East, Europe and South Asian countries (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2008). Africa too has recently been caught in the frenzy of insurgencies to degrees and intensities never experienced before (Akubo and Okolo, 2019). The growth of contemporary transnational insurgencies in Africa tends to be linked to competing systems of attempted governance that are underpinned by complex configurations of networks of power and rule (Dunn and Morton, 2017). Transnational insurgent groups in Africa include: the Somalia based AL Shabab organisations, which have

launched numerous attacks into Kenya and Ethiopia; the Seleka opposition movement in the Central Africa Republic which have conducted trans-border raids into Cameroon as well as Chad and Boko Haram insurgent group in Nigeria whose violent and bloody incursions into Chad, Cameroon and Niger have impacted negatively on these countries (Foyou, Ngwafu, Santoyo and Ortiz 2018: 67). The insurgent activities do not respect sovereign states or their borders which certainly calls for an assessment of the activities and the impact of these transnational non-state actors on state sovereignty. The transnational nature of insurgency requires collaborative effort and, in some instances, international interventions may take the form of military or economic interventions. These collaborations as well as interventions which are problematic in both principle and practice might be detrimental to the sovereignty of the host nations.

Since the inception of the Fourth Republic, Nigeria as a sovereign state has experienced the proliferation of communal and insurgent attack on a scale that has not been experienced before. In view of the fact that various reasons gave rise to these insurgent activities, in most cases the agitations fit the description of asymmetric warfare, in terms of a weak actor employing means at its disposal to fight a stronger actor. The transnational nature of Boko Haram activities can be seen as the most immediate and infectious threat to Nigeria's security and sovereignty. Insurgent activities carried out by the group known as Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria have been propelled by the growth and spread of terrorism across the Sahel region which has threatened to undermine the internal defense, external security system and the sovereignty of Nigeria. The distinguishing characteristics of nationhood is a state's ability to provide security for its citizens, defend her sovereignty and territorial integrity.

From purely a Nigerian phenomenon, Boko Haram has transited into a transnational insurgent group with members and recruitment efforts across, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Mali (Efebah and Efanodor, 2016). The above poses great danger to peace, security and sovereignty of Nigeria (Eselebor, 2011:). Insurgency and terrorism being transnational enterprises are much more prone to spreading into other countries. Hence it can lead to the influx of troops under the guise of co-combating insurgency without the knowledge or approval of the host government, thereby undermining the concept of sovereignty. The close cooperation between insurgency and organized crime in Nigeria also points to a further stimulus by ethnic and religious cleavages in Northern region of Nigeria with low development and education factors that ensured that acts of terror continue. All of these factors have extremes serious implications for regional and international security as well as the sovereignty of the Nigerian state. Nigeria's sovereignty and security are not just connected but inseparable. It is therefore pertinent to examine the implications of the transnational nature of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria state sovereignty.

Previous studies such as (Duerksen, 2021; Oluwadare, 2015) interrogated the evolution of insurgency in Nigeria and the factors necessitating its consistency as well as the socio-economic implications of insurgency in Nigeria. Foyou, Ngwafu, Santoyo and Ortiz (2018) examined the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on collaboration between Nigeria and Cameroon in terms of security and trade. Shodunke (2021) and Iwuoha and Onuoha (2021) concentrated on the counterintelligence and counterterrorism strategies in Nigeria. Similarly, Ojo (2020) explored the narrative of territories in the northern region that are ungoverned. It analysed how jihadist movement and criminal armed groups are ideologically driven by informal networks particularly in the areas unkept by the state but these studies neglected the implications of the insurgent group on Nigeria's state system. Other studies such as Feinberg (2018), from a global perspective, examined sovereignty in the age of global terrorism while Mohammed (2015) examined how foreign intervention in the fight against terrorism have affected Nigeria's sovereignty. However,

there is the lack of explanation about the implication of the transactional nature of Boko Haram activities on Nigerian state sovereignty. This paper therefore devotes attention to analyzing the implications of the transnational nature of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria's sovereignty.

Materials and Method

Taking into cognizance the nature of the study, the basic approach is through the historical route. Hence, the study is descriptive and analytical, employing the use of a wide range of secondary source of information. In the study, the historical method was used to outline the key variables and concepts with the objectives of providing insights from the past and relating it to the present and thus providing understanding and explanation on the origin of insurgency in Nigeria and the implications of the transnational nature of Boko Haram insurgency on Nigeria's sovereignty.

Theoretical Anchor

The theoretical thrust of the paper is anchored on the group theory of the state. The utility of the group theory derives its origin from the work of Bentley (1908-2004), David Truman (1951), Finer (1958-1963) and Lasswell and Kaplan (1950). Advocate of the group theory contends that every society includes within it a number of groups which remain engaged in a perpetual struggle for power and domination over each other. These groups are engaged in a process of balancing and limiting each other, through which harmony between the various interests in society of which groups are the exponents could be maintained.

Group theorists regard groups or the larger society, rather than the individual, as the basic unit of analysis in the study of politics. Society is seen as comprising different groups which is pursuing or promoting their interests (Mazi Mbah, 2006). A group is defined as activities of human beings. The term interest refers to material and economic interest with every individual or group attempting to maximize advantage in a national manner. It also refers to activity as lobbying or pressure for the accomplishing of any given purpose (Mazi Mbah, 2006:297)

Although, the utility of the group theory has been criticized by scholars for glossing over the characteristics of individuals for not considering the nation, and the society, too vague in definition of terms and that it is peculiarly culture bound, being an outgrowth of American political culture. However, in a positive sense Mazi Mbah (2006) noted that the group theory makes it possible to study group competition for position as well as the manner in which interests are organized and expressed. Within the context of the positive evaluation of the group theory, the group theory framework provides the theoretical platform for useful contemporary political analysis of the transnational nature of Boko Haram Insurgency and its implications on Nigeria's sovereignty as it offers useful insights into the activities of the group known as Boko Haram. The group theory is applicable to a plural and heterogeneous society like Nigeria which is characterized by religious fragmentation and ethnic cleavages.

For the benefit of this study, the group analysis is built upon the national and transnational perspective. (i) National analysis: present day Nigeria is experiencing a plurality of groups, where almost every group has several interests. Using the pluralist model of group theory, insurgencies in present day Nigeria could not be divorced from the influence and role of groups, who instigate and fuel crisis in pretense of patriotism and loyalty under the guise of religious, social and economic marginalization to pursue and achieve their own political, religious and economic interest and benefits, To this end on the one hand, Boko Haram has been perceived as a political tool being used by some group of disgruntled Northern politicians to pressure the federal government in the same way politicians from the Niger Delta have used militant groups to ensure what they believe is the fair share of Nigeria's oil reserve.

On the other hand, Boko Haram sect suddenly metamorphosed in 2009 into a group challenging the sovereignty of the Nigerian state. It is believed that one of the aims of Boko Haram is to eradicate westernization in its various forms and to establish an Islamic state governed by sharia laws. One can therefore view the position of this group as a coordinated war against cultural imperialism. Hence, the major targets of the sect hostility are the government and other groups such as Christians, non-supportive Muslims and the western power.

Group theory, which postulates that the interest which is shared attitude concerning a claim to be made by one group upon certain other group in a social system sometimes are in conflict (Varma, 1975), is also applicable to understanding the various factions within Boko Haram group. These fractions are not only at odd with each other but also differ in tactics and goals. One sect calling itself the Yusufiya Islamic movement disagrees with the radical nature of the group's activities after coming under the influence of Abukabar Shekau. They believe in maintaining the systematic approach of the older generation. Another group known as Ansaru expressed displeasure with the current direction of Boko Haram tactics, especially its willingness to commit violent acts against fellow Muslims. The ability or capacity of the Nigeria state to absorb these various interests which are later expanded on the state as demanded could go a long way to ensure stability fix the entire system as a whole.

Transnational analysis: the group theory is also applicable in analyzing the transnational trend of the group known as Boko Haram. At first Boko Haram was mostly, fomenting pockets of sectarian violence in villages, by attacking their targets using clubs, machetes and small arms. They gained international prominence following the use of Improvised Explosive Device (IED). Internationally, the shift in targeting has raised concerns that the group contact with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and the Al-Shabaab had influenced it. As its beliefs and ideology resembles the Taliban of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Shabab of Somalia and the Al Qaeda terrorist group in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel region. Hence, the group is on the trajectory to becoming, the next Jihadist franchise group to become a transnational terrorist group in the West African region, following the step of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the Yemen base Al Qaeda franchise group. The national and transnational perspectives based on the above analysis, explains the relevance of the group theory to understanding the transnational nature of Boko Haram insurgency and its implication on Nigeria's sovereignty.

Results and Discussion

Insurgency in Nigeria: An Historical Analysis

Muzan (2014) argued that the insurgent/terrorism activities in Nigeria have been mostly motivated by ethno-centric consideration. However according to him, recently it has been more motivated in the religious content. Muzan (2014) noted that before the advent of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria previous insurgencies attempt have been as a result of movements to liberate particular reform in Nigeria. Muzan (2014) and Ojuade and Shuaib (2013) both agreed that previous insurgencies in Nigeria varied in their activities, scope, sophistication and intensity. However, they both differ in their classification, numbers of instances and chronological order. While Muzan (2014) listed seven instances in the following chronological order; the declaration of Niger Delta Republic, Nigerian civil war, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign state of Biafra, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and related Insurgences, Oodua People's Congress, Northern Arewa groups, Jama'atu Ahlil sunna Lidawah Wal Jihad (Boko Haram) and Jama'atu Ansaru Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru). Ojuade and Shuaib listed five instances of insurgency in Nigeria in the following chronological order; Oodua people congress, the Bakassi boys, Egbesu boys, Arewa people congress and Boko Haram.

Ojuade and Shuaib (2013) described the insurgent groups as radicalized groups involved in militant ethnic movements in Nigeria. According to him, the radicalised groups consist of irregular or paramilitary personnel made up of civilians, who might have received a form of military training and are armed with small arms and light weapons which they use illegally. The early 1990s in Nigerian history witnessed unprecedented fame for ethnic militias, when Oodua People's Congress was formed in Southwestern part of the country. Dramatically, other regions followed in their formations numbering about five namely; the Oodua People Congress, OPC; the Bakassi Boys, in the Southeast; Egbesu Boys of Africa, in the South-South; Arewa People's Congress, APC, in the north and the Boko Haram from the North.

According to Ojuade and Shuaib (2013) it has been observed that these groups emerged at different times and operated in different parts of the country but with common trends that cut across them. Ironically, the groups or militias were set up to protect interests that are more sectional in approach which were perceived as being threatened by either development at the regional level or at the federal level. The personality or ethnic configuration of the person at the helm of affairs dictates or serves as a pointer or shift to where or which part of the aggrieved area comes up with a group.

Prior to 1999, Nigeria witnessed two religious uprising in its history, the Maitatsine uprising (the Al- Masifu sect) of 1980 and the Yobe Taliban (the Al- Sunna WalJamma sect) of 2002 (George, 2013). Danjibo (2009) observed that the Maitatsine rebellion in the Second Republic was among the early manifestation of Islamic radicalism in Northern Nigeria. According to him, the founder of the sect "Maitatsine movement" Muhammadu Marwa an Islamic scholar, who migrated to Kano from Marwa in Northern Cameroon in 1945, was worried that modernization and the formation of modern state by the colonial system had adulterated Islam. Marwa exploited the dwindling economic situation and the almajeri system to attract large followership among the commoners. These groups who are unable to afford the basic necessities of life became die-hard members of the sect. The Maitatsine doctrine rejected the Hadith (traditions of the prophet of Islam) as a source of law and condemned reading any book other than the Quran.

However, the period from 1999 witnessed a geometric increase in all forms of conflict/violence ranging from electoral violence, human trafficking, ethno-religious conflicts, Niger Delta crisis and kidnapping (Asuquo, 2013:273). Amongst these, it was the Niger Delta crisis that severely threatened the peace and progress of Nigeria, which therefore attracted the attention of the international community. This event led to the Amnesty programme announced by the Federal Government to all militants in the Niger Delta region on 25th June 2009 to surrender their arms and unconditionally renounce militancy. The success of the Amnesty programme was commendable. Unexpectedly, a new trend of internal security emerged on October 1, 2010 as the nation marked her 50th independence anniversary. While, the Independence Day celebration was on at the eagle square in Abuja, there was an explosion from a twin bomb blast at the venue. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was blamed for the blast (Asuquo, 2013).

Following the level of security dilemma accompanying the Niger-Delta insurgency group's activities, Nigerians were labeled a personal non granta in the international scene and in the same vein, foreign countries warned their nationals to avoid going to Nigeria, especially Niger Delta region where kidnapping, maiming and arson have become rife. The last straw that breaks the camel's back was the blacklisting of Nigeria, as among the 14th terrorist nations in the world owing to Abdumutallab Farouk's, a Nigerian attempt to bomb a US aircraft on Christmas day, in 2009 and the designation of Boko Haram as global terrorist organization (Asuquo, 2013).

The Boko Haram group caught the attention of international community following a series of violent attacks in Nigeria since July 2009 and specifically with the attack on the United Nations building in Abuja in 2011 and the group's alleged involvement in the kidnap and subsequent killing of a British and an Italian national in March 2012 (Ola, 2012). The sequence of events that followed informed the US African Command (AFRICOM) commander General Carter Hamin in September 2011 to list Boko Haram as one of the three African terrorist groups. Furthermore, in June 2012, the US government named three leaders of the sect as global terrorist and on November 2013, the U.S Department added the Nigerian Jihadist group Boko Haram and its splinter group faction known as Ansaru to the lists of foreign terrorist organisation and specially designated Global terrorist entities (Vanguard, Nov 2013)

The emergence of Boko Haram Sect and the dimension of terror it has unleashed are indicative of rebellion against the Federal government of Nigeria. It has been argued that the extra judicial killings of Mallam Mohammed Yusuf in July 2009 marked the formal confrontation between the Nigerian state and the radical Islamist organization named Jama'atu AhlulSunnah Lil-DalawaliWal Jihad which is interpreted to mean people committed to the propagation of the teaching of the prophet and jihad (Gbemisola, 2013). According to Salawu, (2013) the sect was of a humble beginning comprising self-opinionated youths who might have harboured grievances against the state. However, its infiltration by politicians for electoral purpose turned to an insurgent group. This was as a result of the self-aggrandizement of a few who must secure power by any means. The sect grew to become an Islamic movement which opposes man-made laws, and seeks to establish Sharia law in Nigeria (Salawa, 2013). In mid-April 2014, Boko Haram was thrust into the global spotlight after it abducted 276 school girls from Chibok, a town of about 60,000 population, in Nigeria's Northeastern Borno state. The abduction of the girls was clearly a turning point in Boko Haram's war against the Nigerian civilian population.

Boko Haram's activities took a transnational nature with the recruitment of mercenaries and militarized refugees, training in jihadist camps in other countries of the Sahel region and smuggling of weapons (Donasco, 2014). According to Donasco (2014) Boko Haram fighters travelled to Mali to establish closer relations with the militant Salafist group AQIM (movement for oneness and Jihad in West Africa) and Ansar-al-Dine. The pattern of attacks indicates that the insurgents are scattered along remote areas of the region, close to Lake Chad and Nigeria's borders with Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Mamman Nur believed to be second in command to Shekau is from Chad, while Abukakar Kilakam and Ali Jalingo responsible for major attacks in the Northeastern Borno state are said to be from Niger Republic (Donasco, 2014).

According to Boggle (2013) cited in Efebah and Efanodor (2016) it has been alleged that Boko Haram has a training base in the North of Mali as well as has strong ties with the Tuareqs of Mali. In August 2013, it was reported that Boko Haram was among a number of Jihadist groups such as the movement of the Taliban in Pakistan, the Islamic state of Iraq and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb that participated in a series of communications with top leadership of the al Qaeda (Boggle, 2013).

There were concerns in Nigeria that ISIS members may strengthen their bond with Boko Haram. Boko Haram sect was said to have pledged allegiance to ISIS on May 7, 2015 and was accepted by the ISIS leaders on May 13, 2015 (Punch Newspaper 2015 August 24). Similarly, in order to strengthen ties with the Islamic State, Boko Haram is believed to have dispatched no fewer than 80 of its members to join forces with ISIS extremist fighting in Libya (Punch Newspaper August 2015).

Furthermore, the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) a splinter group of Boko Haram has also become a splinter militant group of the Islamic State (IS) that has ravaged the peace and security around the world. The fragment group ISWAP is growing in power and influence. From its territorial base on the banks and Islands of Lake Chad, the group is waging a guerrilla war within the borders of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger republic (Nwuko, 2022). The attack on St Francis Catholic Church in Owo, Ondo state and the 5th July attack on Kuje Medium security custodial centre which the group claim responsibility for have shed more light on the advancement of ISWAP into Nigeria (Malik, 2022). According to Malik (2022) the attack on Kuje prison might have responded to Islamic State' (ISIS) call in April 2022 to free jailed fighters. In the Kuje prison attack, it was reported that, 879 detainees escaped including 68 imprisoned Boko Haram members. The transnational nature and activities of the sect, therefore, constitute a danger to the sovereignty of Nigeria and the international community, since their activities transcend Nigeria, the West African region and beyond.

Transnational Insurgency and Nigeria's State Sovereignty: The Implications

Sovereignty is the fundamental attribute of statehood. State sovereignty was premise on a territorial world. It is the main symbol of statehood and the legal basis of its existence (Akinboye and Ottoh, 2005). Conventional theory of sovereignty upholds supreme legal authority of the state in internal as well as external sphere. Internal sovereignty is where the sovereign or government exercises absolute authority over a particular society. Externally, there is no absolute authority above and beyond the state (Efanodor, 2012:1).

Transnational insurgency constitutes a challenge to the concept of state sovereignty and responses in the form of counterterrorism will also inherently challenge state sovereignty. Boko Haram insurgency has taken a transnational dimension because the activities of the insurgent group have spilled over into Northern Cameroon and parts of Niger and Chad. The group Boko Haram operates across Nigeria's borders as global non-state actors. Nigeria's neighbour had been attacked by Boko Haram insurgent group because the activities of Boko Haram take place within the boundaries which cover northern Nigeria, the Northern tip of Cameroon, Southwestern Chad and Northeastern Niger. In such circumstances the affected countries can invoke article 51 of United Nations Charter. The inherent right of a state to self-defence or a group of states to collective self-defence is mandated under international law and enshrined in article 51 of the United Nation's charter (Mohammed, 2015). The actions of such a state in invoking article 51 of the UN has the potential of infringing on the sovereignty of a state.

This transnational dimension of crime and extremism makes coordination of foreign and domestic intelligence and law enforcement across border essential and the need to contain the group has taken on a regional dimension. For instance, the insecurity in the lake Chad region occasioned by armed banditry along Nigerian border with Chad, Cameroon and Niger state led to the establishment of a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 1998 with Baga town, Kukawa Local Government Area of Borno State, Nigeria as the headquarter. The initial mandate of the task force was to tackle banditry activities and to facilitate free movement of member states across their common borders. However, with the activities of Boko Haram in Baga due to its proximity to porous border led to the additional mandate of the task force in April 2012 to include the fight against terrorism (Robert-Okah, 2014 cited in Mohammed, 2015). Thus, the implication of the above is that the actions of national government in counterterrorism mean that the state is not the only actor to deal with security threat in its own territory. Hence, the above can lead to the influx of troops under the guise of co-combating insurgency without the knowledge or approval of the Nigerian government, thereby undermining the concept of sovereignty. For instance, from

14th to 16th of March 2015, Chad seized the opportunity to move in troops from Fototol and organized operations that liberated Gamboru, a border town in Northeast Nigeria and further pushed into Nigerian territory to retake the Borno town of Dikwa (Bayewu, 2015). On 18th June 2015, Chadian warplane bombed Boko Haram hideouts inside Nigeria to avenge the twin suicide bombings in the N'Djamena that left 33 people dead and more than 100 wounded (Daily Trust, 2015). The airstrike was carried out unilaterally which violates the operations mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the sovereignty of Nigeria. Similarly, on 29th August 2015 concerns were also raised over the possible violation of Nigeria's sovereignty as the Chadian government in collaboration with its Cameroonian counterpart, sent troops to recapture Nigerian border town of Baga from Boko Haram insurgent without the knowledge or approval of Nigerian government (Ibekwe, 2015) thereby disregarding the concept of sovereignty.

Similarly, foreign rescue mission and intervention also have propensity of undermining Nigeria's sovereignty. For instance, on 31st October 2020, the United States forces TEAM 6 responsible for West Africa operations, conducted a hostage rescue operation during the early hours in Northern Nigeria to rescue Mr. Philip Walton who was kidnapped in Niger by armed men suspected to be members of Boko Haram. According to the report, the elite commandos parachuted into Nigeria. For the U.S.A concern grew after the kidnapping that an opportunity to rescue Walton could become much more dangerous if he was taken by or sold to a group of Islamist militias aligned with either Al Qaeda or ISIS. Hence the rescue mission with permission or not became eminent. The rescue operation arouses speculations as to whether or not the U.S army operation violated Nigeria's sovereignty. However, the minister of Defense, Bashir Magashi cleared the air that the U.S army got Nigeria's permission to rescue its citizen in Northern Nigeria (Iroanusi, 2020). Similarly, according to the Leadership Newspaper, (2015), Cameroon also single handedly launched a successful rescue operation that saved the life a German citizen, Nitsch Eber-hard from Boko Haram insurgent group in Nigeria. It was not clear whether Nigeria had prior knowledge of the rescue operation or not.

Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria can also be seen in the context of a battle for the parallel state or an attempt to establish neo-feudal government structure. It is believed that one of the aims of Boko Haram is the eradication of westernization in its various forms and the establishment of an Islamic state governed by sharia laws. One can therefore view the position of this group as a coordinated war against cultural imperialism and an attempt to undermine the sovereignty of the Nigerian state. The radical Islamist group Boko Haram rejects the contemporary system of territorially defined sovereignty of a nation state as illegitimate and seeks to replace it with a Sharia based pan National Muslim polity. The extremists advocate violent method to bring about the desired political change. On August 2014, Boko Haram declared an Islamic caliphate in the predominately Christian town of Gwoza, a claim which the Nigerian government immediately rejected, stating that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Nigerian state is still intact (Zaimore, 2014, Foyou, Ngwafu, Santoyo and Ortiz, 2018). This was the trend between 2014 and 2015, Boko Haram kept declaring the towns and villages it had seized in northeastern Nigeria as Islamic states until those towns and village were retaken by the Nigerian government. For instance, in November 2014, an AFP report confirmed that more than two dozen towns and villages in Northeastern Nigeria were controlled by Boko Haram (Foyou, Ngwafu, Santoyo and Ortiz, 2018). In 2020, Chad which was a member of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) issued Nigeria and Niger republic an April 22 ultimatum to reoccupy territories Chadian troops seized from Boko Haram (This Day, 12, 2020). In January 2022, the Governor of Borno state, Babagana Zulum disclosed that two local government headquarters are still under the control of Boko Haram terrorist. These

local government areas are Malamfatori in Abadam and Guzamala. He further disclosed that Boko Haram insurgent group mount check points between Damboa and Biu, and they collect taxes from communities. (Daily trust, January 2022). However, the Chief of Defence Staff, General Lucky Irabor, in February 2022, emphasised that with the operation Lafiya Dole now Hadin Kai in the north east, Hadarin Daji in the north west and different operations in the north central, the Nigerian military have been able to recover some spaces. According to him at the peak of insurgency, 14 local government areas, especially in Borno, were under the control of Boko Haram but currently there is none under their control. Furthermore, according to the Chief of General Staff, in Yobe state as well as in Adamawa, almost four local government areas which were under the control of Boko Haram are currently no longer under the control of the insurgent group (Guardian, February 2022).

Boko Haram insurgency challenges the sovereignty of the Nigerian state because it questions the state's ability to protect its citizens against violence. The implication of the challenge shows the tradeoff that states will face and the compromises that they will need to adopt in order to balance the protection of their citizens and territory with their desire to retain the primary responsible actor for national security. Insurgencies that challenge state legitimacy and tend to inhibit governance are key national and global security issues. In mid-April, 2014, Boko Haram was thrust into the global spotlight after it abducted 276 school girls in Chibok, a town of about 60,000 people, in Nigeria's north eastern Borno state. The abduction of these girls was clearly a turning point in Boko Haram's war against civilian population. This incident galvanized global condemnation of Boko Haram's barbaric acts of violence. The abductions triggered international outrage and protests which also tend to criticize the response of Nigerian authorities to the kidnapping. On November, 17 2014 a town in Northeastern Nigeria was captured by Boko Haram insurgents, only to be recaptured two days later by troops of the Nigerian army that same month. A suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber disguised in school uniform set off explosion that ripped through an all-boys school in Potiskum, killing 47 students (AFP, 2014). Boko haram through its activities has continued to claim lives and shattered properties.

The transnational nature of Boko Haram makes the insurgent group find sanctuary in neighbouring states with the aid of technological strides. The internet provides the freedom to move beyond boundaries. The fact that we are living in the age of information allows Boko Harm to co-ordinate its operations and make alliances. This includes the use of media to transmit message, attacks and operations, broadcast threats, solicit recruits and transmit operation directive across multiple areas. The information age provides the insurgent group with a permissive environment favouring the emergence of extremist cells. Therefore, radical enclaves have risen and served as catalysts for border radicalization (Sviliran, 2014). The reality of the information age with regard to the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria is that it has loosened important cultural and psychological sovereignty of the Nigerian state. The implication of this is that as a result the massive technological strides which has created high level of instantaneous and simultaneous apprehension of event across borders; through the sophisticated information technology, the E-mail, the internet, global mobile network system (GSM) and the growth of trans-border network which to a large extent defy national boundaries or sovereignty censorship, some Nigerian citizens have acquired loyalties to and sympathy for Boko Haram insurgent group that supplement and perhaps even over ride feelings on national solidarity against the activities of the insurgent (Afe and Efanodor, 2012:4). The effect of the above manifest in the insurgent group eroding state solvency through corrupt practices and subtle co-option of state officials and its institutions.

Conclusion

Boko Haram insurgent group increasingly operates across borders as a global non-state actor. This transnational dimension of crime and extremism makes coordination of foreign and domestic intelligence as well as counter terrorism operations essential because it often impact on the state sovereignty of Nigeria. Security is a core component of state sovereignty and Boko haram threat has superseded territorial and nationality concept hence the actions of national governments in counter terrorism means that state is not the only actor to deal with security threat in its own country. The study has shown that the presence of other countries has violated the sovereignty of Nigeria in its multinational co operations in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency. Although the implications on Nigeria's sovereignty are numerous, however, joint counter-terrorism intervention has helped to reduce the attacks and activities of Boko haram.

Recommendations.

Flowing from the above, it is recommended that Nigerian government and other affected states should intensify their internal counter insurgency strategies in order to bring an end to the menace of Boko haram insurgent group. Government along border states must engage in strategic collaborative agreements that would enable them to establish long-term border security arrangements that are necessary to contain the expansionist agendas of insurgent groups. This is because collaboration between border states in areas with high insurgency remains a key strategy for containing and defeating the insurgent groups. Also, Nigerian government should investigate the sponsors of Boko Haram and block the financial flow.

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